diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'libcurl/src/lib/hostcheck.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | libcurl/src/lib/hostcheck.c | 147 |
1 files changed, 147 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libcurl/src/lib/hostcheck.c b/libcurl/src/lib/hostcheck.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1bc330d --- /dev/null +++ b/libcurl/src/lib/hostcheck.c @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+#include "curl_setup.h"
+
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_AXTLS) || defined(USE_GSKIT)
+/* these backends use functions from this file */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+#include "rawstr.h"
+#include "inet_pton.h"
+
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+/* The last #include file should be: */
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+/*
+ * Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
+ * E.g.
+ * "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com".
+ *
+ * We use the matching rule described in RFC6125, section 6.4.3.
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+ *
+ * In addition: ignore trailing dots in the host names and wildcards, so that
+ * the names are used normalized. This is what the browsers do.
+ *
+ * Do not allow wildcard matching on IP numbers. There are apparently
+ * certificates being used with an IP address in the CN field, thus making no
+ * apparent distinction between a name and an IP. We need to detect the use of
+ * an IP address and not wildcard match on such names.
+ *
+ * NOTE: hostmatch() gets called with copied buffers so that it can modify the
+ * contents at will.
+ */
+
+static int hostmatch(char *hostname, char *pattern)
+{
+ const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
+ int wildcard_enabled;
+ size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
+ struct in_addr ignored;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct sockaddr_in6 si6;
+#endif
+
+ /* normalize pattern and hostname by stripping off trailing dots */
+ size_t len = strlen(hostname);
+ if(hostname[len-1]=='.')
+ hostname[len-1]=0;
+ len = strlen(pattern);
+ if(pattern[len-1]=='.')
+ pattern[len-1]=0;
+
+ pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
+ if(pattern_wildcard == NULL)
+ return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ /* detect IP address as hostname and fail the match if so */
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &ignored) > 0)
+ return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &si6.sin6_addr) > 0)
+ return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+#endif
+
+ /* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard
+ match. */
+ wildcard_enabled = 1;
+ pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.');
+ if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end+1, '.') == NULL ||
+ pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end ||
+ Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, "xn--", 4)) {
+ wildcard_enabled = 0;
+ }
+ if(!wildcard_enabled)
+ return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
+ if(hostname_label_end == NULL ||
+ !Curl_raw_equal(pattern_label_end, hostname_label_end))
+ return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ /* The wildcard must match at least one character, so the left-most
+ label of the hostname is at least as large as the left-most label
+ of the pattern. */
+ if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern)
+ return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
+ suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard+1);
+ return Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) &&
+ Curl_raw_nequal(pattern_wildcard+1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
+ suffixlen) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+}
+
+CURL_STATIC int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
+{
+ char *matchp;
+ char *hostp;
+ int res = 0;
+ if(!match_pattern || !*match_pattern ||
+ !hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */
+ ;
+ else {
+ matchp = strdup(match_pattern);
+ if(matchp) {
+ hostp = strdup(hostname);
+ if(hostp) {
+ if(hostmatch(hostp, matchp) == CURL_HOST_MATCH)
+ res= 1;
+ free(hostp);
+ }
+ free(matchp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL or AXTLS or GSKIT */
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