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-rw-r--r--libcurl/src/lib/vtls/nss.c2006
1 files changed, 2006 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libcurl/src/lib/vtls/nss.c b/libcurl/src/lib/vtls/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c17612
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcurl/src/lib/vtls/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2006 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Source file for all NSS-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
+ * but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
+ */
+
+#include "../curl_setup.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include "urldata.h"
+#include "sendf.h"
+#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
+#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "connect.h"
+#include "strequal.h"
+#include "select.h"
+#include "vtls.h"
+#include "llist.h"
+#include "curl_printf.h"
+#include "nssg.h"
+#include <nspr.h>
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+
+#define NSSVERNUM ((NSS_VMAJOR<<16)|(NSS_VMINOR<<8)|NSS_VPATCH)
+
+#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f00 /* 3.15.0 */
+#include <ocsp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "rawstr.h"
+#include "warnless.h"
+#include "x509asn1.h"
+
+/* The last #include files should be: */
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+#define SSL_DIR "/etc/pki/nssdb"
+
+/* enough to fit the string "PEM Token #[0|1]" */
+#define SLOTSIZE 13
+
+PRFileDesc *PR_ImportTCPSocket(PRInt32 osfd);
+
+PRLock * nss_initlock = NULL;
+PRLock * nss_crllock = NULL;
+struct curl_llist *nss_crl_list = NULL;
+NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+volatile int initialized = 0;
+
+typedef struct {
+ const char *name;
+ int num;
+} cipher_s;
+
+#define PK11_SETATTRS(_attr, _idx, _type, _val, _len) do { \
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *ptr = (_attr) + ((_idx)++); \
+ ptr->type = (_type); \
+ ptr->pValue = (_val); \
+ ptr->ulValueLen = (_len); \
+} WHILE_FALSE
+
+#define CERT_NewTempCertificate __CERT_NewTempCertificate
+
+#define NUM_OF_CIPHERS sizeof(cipherlist)/sizeof(cipherlist[0])
+static const cipher_s cipherlist[] = {
+ /* SSL2 cipher suites */
+ {"rc4", SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5},
+ {"rc4-md5", SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5},
+ {"rc4export", SSL_EN_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5},
+ {"rc2", SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+ {"rc2export", SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5},
+ {"des", SSL_EN_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+ {"desede3", SSL_EN_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+ /* SSL3/TLS cipher suites */
+ {"rsa_rc4_128_md5", SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"rsa_rc4_128_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"rsa_3des_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"rsa_des_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"rsa_rc4_40_md5", SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5},
+ {"rsa_rc2_40_md5", SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5},
+ {"rsa_null_md5", SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"rsa_null_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"fips_3des_sha", SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"fips_des_sha", SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"fortezza", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"fortezza_rc4_128_sha", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"fortezza_null", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ /* TLS 1.0: Exportable 56-bit Cipher Suites. */
+ {"rsa_des_56_sha", TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"rsa_rc4_56_sha", TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA},
+ /* AES ciphers. */
+ {"dhe_dss_aes_128_cbc_sha", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"dhe_dss_aes_256_cbc_sha", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"dhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"dhe_rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ /* ECC ciphers. */
+ {"ecdh_ecdsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_ecdsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_rsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_rsa_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"echde_rsa_null", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_anon_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_anon_rc4_128sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_anon_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_anon_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"ecdh_anon_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+#ifdef TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+ /* new HMAC-SHA256 cipher suites specified in RFC */
+ {"rsa_null_sha_256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha_256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"dhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"dhe_rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha_256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ /* AES GCM cipher suites in RFC 5288 and RFC 5289 */
+ {"rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"dhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"dhe_dss_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+#endif
+};
+
+static const char* pem_library = "libnsspem.so";
+SECMODModule* mod = NULL;
+
+/* NSPR I/O layer we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
+static PRDescIdentity nspr_io_identity = PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER;
+static PRIOMethods nspr_io_methods;
+
+static const char* nss_error_to_name(PRErrorCode code)
+{
+ const char *name = PR_ErrorToName(code);
+ if(name)
+ return name;
+
+ return "unknown error";
+}
+
+static void nss_print_error_message(struct SessionHandle *data, PRUint32 err)
+{
+ failf(data, "%s", PR_ErrorToString(err, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
+}
+
+static SECStatus set_ciphers(struct SessionHandle *data, PRFileDesc * model,
+ char *cipher_list)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ PRBool cipher_state[NUM_OF_CIPHERS];
+ PRBool found;
+ char *cipher;
+
+ /* First disable all ciphers. This uses a different max value in case
+ * NSS adds more ciphers later we don't want them available by
+ * accident
+ */
+ for(i=0; i<SSL_NumImplementedCiphers; i++) {
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ /* Set every entry in our list to false */
+ for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+ cipher_state[i] = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ cipher = cipher_list;
+
+ while(cipher_list && (cipher_list[0])) {
+ while((*cipher) && (ISSPACE(*cipher)))
+ ++cipher;
+
+ if((cipher_list = strchr(cipher, ','))) {
+ *cipher_list++ = '\0';
+ }
+
+ found = PR_FALSE;
+
+ for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(cipher, cipherlist[i].name)) {
+ cipher_state[i] = PR_TRUE;
+ found = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(found == PR_FALSE) {
+ failf(data, "Unknown cipher in list: %s", cipher);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if(cipher_list) {
+ cipher = cipher_list;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Finally actually enable the selected ciphers */
+ for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+ if(!cipher_state[i])
+ continue;
+
+ if(SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, cipherlist[i].num, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
+ failf(data, "cipher-suite not supported by NSS: %s", cipherlist[i].name);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the number of ciphers that are enabled. We use this to determine
+ * if we need to call NSS_SetDomesticPolicy() to enable the default ciphers.
+ */
+static int num_enabled_ciphers(void)
+{
+ PRInt32 policy = 0;
+ int count = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+ SSL_CipherPolicyGet(cipherlist[i].num, &policy);
+ if(policy)
+ count++;
+ }
+ return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether the nickname passed in is a filename that needs to
+ * be loaded as a PEM or a regular NSS nickname.
+ *
+ * returns 1 for a file
+ * returns 0 for not a file (NSS nickname)
+ */
+static int is_file(const char *filename)
+{
+ struct_stat st;
+
+ if(filename == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if(stat(filename, &st) == 0)
+ if(S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check if the given string is filename or nickname of a certificate. If the
+ * given string is recognized as filename, return NULL. If the given string is
+ * recognized as nickname, return a duplicated string. The returned string
+ * should be later deallocated using free(). If the OOM failure occurs, we
+ * return NULL, too.
+ */
+static char* dup_nickname(struct SessionHandle *data, enum dupstring cert_kind)
+{
+ const char *str = data->set.str[cert_kind];
+ const char *n;
+
+ if(!is_file(str))
+ /* no such file exists, use the string as nickname */
+ return strdup(str);
+
+ /* search the last slash; we require at least one slash in a file name */
+ n = strrchr(str, '/');
+ if(!n) {
+ infof(data, "warning: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; "
+ "please use \"./%s\" to force file name\n", str, str);
+ return strdup(str);
+ }
+
+ /* we'll use the PEM reader to read the certificate from file */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Call PK11_CreateGenericObject() with the given obj_class and filename. If
+ * the call succeeds, append the object handle to the list of objects so that
+ * the object can be destroyed in Curl_nss_close(). */
+static CURLcode nss_create_object(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl,
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_class,
+ const char *filename, bool cacert)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ PK11GenericObject *obj;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[/* max count of attributes */ 4];
+ int attr_cnt = 0;
+ CURLcode result = (cacert)
+ ? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
+ : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+ const int slot_id = (cacert) ? 0 : 1;
+ char *slot_name = aprintf("PEM Token #%d", slot_id);
+ if(!slot_name)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slot_name);
+ free(slot_name);
+ if(!slot)
+ return result;
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_CLASS, &obj_class, sizeof(obj_class));
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_LABEL, (unsigned char *)filename,
+ strlen(filename) + 1);
+
+ if(CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class) {
+ CK_BBOOL *pval = (cacert) ? (&cktrue) : (&ckfalse);
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TRUST, pval, sizeof(*pval));
+ }
+
+ obj = PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot, attrs, attr_cnt, PR_FALSE);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if(!obj)
+ return result;
+
+ if(!Curl_llist_insert_next(ssl->obj_list, ssl->obj_list->tail, obj)) {
+ PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj);
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if(!cacert && CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class)
+ /* store reference to a client certificate */
+ ssl->obj_clicert = obj;
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* Destroy the NSS object whose handle is given by ptr. This function is
+ * a callback of Curl_llist_alloc() used by Curl_llist_destroy() to destroy
+ * NSS objects in Curl_nss_close() */
+static void nss_destroy_object(void *user, void *ptr)
+{
+ PK11GenericObject *obj = (PK11GenericObject *)ptr;
+ (void) user;
+ PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj);
+}
+
+/* same as nss_destroy_object() but for CRL items */
+static void nss_destroy_crl_item(void *user, void *ptr)
+{
+ SECItem *crl_der = (SECItem *)ptr;
+ (void) user;
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_cert(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl,
+ const char *filename, PRBool cacert)
+{
+ CURLcode result = (cacert)
+ ? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
+ : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+ /* libnsspem.so leaks memory if the requested file does not exist. For more
+ * details, go to <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/734760>. */
+ if(is_file(filename))
+ result = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_CERTIFICATE, filename, cacert);
+
+ if(!result && !cacert) {
+ /* we have successfully loaded a client certificate */
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *nickname = NULL;
+ char *n = strrchr(filename, '/');
+ if(n)
+ n++;
+
+ /* The following undocumented magic helps to avoid a SIGSEGV on call
+ * of PK11_ReadRawAttribute() from SelectClientCert() when using an
+ * immature version of libnsspem.so. For more details, go to
+ * <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/733685>. */
+ nickname = aprintf("PEM Token #1:%s", n);
+ if(nickname) {
+ cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(nickname, NULL);
+ if(cert)
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ free(nickname);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* add given CRL to cache if it is not already there */
+static CURLcode nss_cache_crl(SECItem *crl_der)
+{
+ CERTCertDBHandle *db = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl = SEC_FindCrlByDERCert(db, crl_der, 0);
+ if(crl) {
+ /* CRL already cached */
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* acquire lock before call of CERT_CacheCRL() and accessing nss_crl_list */
+ PR_Lock(nss_crllock);
+
+ /* store the CRL item so that we can free it in Curl_nss_cleanup() */
+ if(!Curl_llist_insert_next(nss_crl_list, nss_crl_list->tail, crl_der)) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if(SECSuccess != CERT_CacheCRL(db, crl_der)) {
+ /* unable to cache CRL */
+ PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+ }
+
+ /* we need to clear session cache, so that the CRL could take effect */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+ PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_crl(const char* crlfilename)
+{
+ PRFileDesc *infile;
+ PRFileInfo info;
+ SECItem filedata = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem *crl_der = NULL;
+ char *body;
+
+ infile = PR_Open(crlfilename, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+ if(!infile)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+
+ if(PR_SUCCESS != PR_GetOpenFileInfo(infile, &info))
+ goto fail;
+
+ if(!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &filedata, info.size + /* zero ended */ 1))
+ goto fail;
+
+ if(info.size != PR_Read(infile, filedata.data, info.size))
+ goto fail;
+
+ crl_der = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, 0U);
+ if(!crl_der)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* place a trailing zero right after the visible data */
+ body = (char*)filedata.data;
+ body[--filedata.len] = '\0';
+
+ body = strstr(body, "-----BEGIN");
+ if(body) {
+ /* assume ASCII */
+ char *trailer;
+ char *begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\n');
+ if(!begin)
+ begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\r');
+ if(!begin)
+ goto fail;
+
+ trailer = strstr(++begin, "-----END");
+ if(!trailer)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* retrieve DER from ASCII */
+ *trailer = '\0';
+ if(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(crl_der, begin))
+ goto fail;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ else
+ /* assume DER */
+ *crl_der = filedata;
+
+ PR_Close(infile);
+ return nss_cache_crl(crl_der);
+
+fail:
+ PR_Close(infile);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_key(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+ char *key_file)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ SECStatus status;
+ CURLcode result;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *ssl = conn->ssl;
+
+ (void)sockindex; /* unused */
+
+ result = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, key_file, FALSE);
+ if(result) {
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY, 0);
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ slot = PK11_FindSlotByName("PEM Token #1");
+ if(!slot)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+ /* This will force the token to be seen as re-inserted */
+ SECMOD_WaitForAnyTokenEvent(mod, 0, 0);
+ PK11_IsPresent(slot);
+
+ status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE,
+ conn->data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ return (SECSuccess == status) ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+}
+
+static int display_error(struct connectdata *conn, PRInt32 err,
+ const char *filename)
+{
+ switch(err) {
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD:
+ failf(conn->data, "Unable to load client key: Incorrect password");
+ return 1;
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CERT:
+ failf(conn->data, "Unable to load certificate %s", filename);
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0; /* The caller will print a generic error */
+}
+
+static CURLcode cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+ char *cert_file, char *key_file)
+{
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ CURLcode result;
+
+ if(cert_file) {
+ result = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cert_file, PR_FALSE);
+ if(result) {
+ const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+ if(!display_error(conn, err, cert_file)) {
+ const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+ failf(data, "unable to load client cert: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
+ }
+
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(key_file || (is_file(cert_file))) {
+ if(key_file)
+ result = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, key_file);
+ else
+ /* In case the cert file also has the key */
+ result = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, cert_file);
+ if(result) {
+ const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+ if(!display_error(conn, err, key_file)) {
+ const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+ failf(data, "unable to load client key: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
+ }
+
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static char * nss_get_password(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ (void)slot; /* unused */
+
+ if(retry || NULL == arg)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ return (char *)PORT_Strdup((char *)arg);
+}
+
+/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
+ * verify peer */
+static SECStatus nss_auth_cert_hook(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig,
+ PRBool isServer)
+{
+ struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
+ if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
+ SECStatus cacheResult;
+
+ const SECItemArray *csa = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd);
+ if(!csa) {
+ failf(conn->data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if(csa->len == 0) {
+ failf(conn->data, "No OCSP response received");
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ cacheResult = CERT_CacheOCSPResponseFromSideChannel(
+ CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), SSL_PeerCertificate(fd),
+ PR_Now(), &csa->items[0], arg
+ );
+
+ if(cacheResult != SECSuccess) {
+ failf(conn->data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+ return cacheResult;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ infof(conn->data, "skipping SSL peer certificate verification\n");
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ return SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), fd, checksig, isServer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Inform the application that the handshake is complete.
+ */
+static void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *arg)
+{
+ struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata*) arg;
+ unsigned int buflenmax = 50;
+ unsigned char buf[50];
+ unsigned int buflen;
+ SSLNextProtoState state;
+
+ if(!conn->data->set.ssl_enable_npn && !conn->data->set.ssl_enable_alpn) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if(SSL_GetNextProto(sock, &state, buf, &buflen, buflenmax) == SECSuccess) {
+
+ switch(state) {
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT:
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP:
+ infof(conn->data, "ALPN/NPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
+ return;
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_ALPN
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED:
+ infof(conn->data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", buflen, buf);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED:
+ infof(conn->data, "NPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", buflen, buf);
+ break;
+ }
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(buflen == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
+ !memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, buf, NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2_0;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(buflen == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
+ !memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, buf, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static SECStatus CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *client_data,
+ PRBool *canFalseStart)
+{
+ struct connectdata *conn = client_data;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+
+ SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
+
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool negotiatedExtension;
+
+ *canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
+ sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /* Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for
+ * TLS 1.3 and later. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=861310
+ */
+ if(channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Only allow ECDHE key exchange algorithm.
+ * See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=952863 */
+ if(cipherInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We do not allow CBC
+ * mode due to BEAST, POODLE, and other attacks on the MAC-then-Encrypt
+ * design. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1109766 */
+ if(cipherInfo.symCipher != ssl_calg_aes_gcm)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Enforce ALPN or NPN to do False Start, as an indicator of server
+ * compatibility. */
+ rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(sock, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn,
+ &negotiatedExtension);
+ if(rv != SECSuccess || !negotiatedExtension) {
+ rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(sock, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn,
+ &negotiatedExtension);
+ }
+
+ if(rv != SECSuccess || !negotiatedExtension)
+ goto end;
+
+ *canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
+
+ infof(data, "Trying TLS False Start\n");
+
+end:
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static void display_cert_info(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ CERTCertificate *cert)
+{
+ char *subject, *issuer, *common_name;
+ PRExplodedTime printableTime;
+ char timeString[256];
+ PRTime notBefore, notAfter;
+
+ subject = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject);
+ issuer = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer);
+ common_name = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject);
+ infof(data, "\tsubject: %s\n", subject);
+
+ CERT_GetCertTimes(cert, &notBefore, &notAfter);
+ PR_ExplodeTime(notBefore, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime);
+ PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime);
+ infof(data, "\tstart date: %s\n", timeString);
+ PR_ExplodeTime(notAfter, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime);
+ PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime);
+ infof(data, "\texpire date: %s\n", timeString);
+ infof(data, "\tcommon name: %s\n", common_name);
+ infof(data, "\tissuer: %s\n", issuer);
+
+ PR_Free(subject);
+ PR_Free(issuer);
+ PR_Free(common_name);
+}
+
+static CURLcode display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ CERTCertificate *cert2;
+ CERTCertificate *cert3;
+ PRTime now;
+ int i;
+
+ if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channel, sizeof channel) ==
+ SECSuccess && channel.length == sizeof channel &&
+ channel.cipherSuite) {
+ if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite,
+ &suite, sizeof suite) == SECSuccess) {
+ infof(conn->data, "SSL connection using %s\n", suite.cipherSuiteName);
+ }
+ }
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+ if(cert) {
+ infof(conn->data, "Server certificate:\n");
+
+ if(!conn->data->set.ssl.certinfo) {
+ display_cert_info(conn->data, cert);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Count certificates in chain. */
+ now = PR_Now();
+ i = 1;
+ if(!cert->isRoot) {
+ cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
+ while(cert2) {
+ i++;
+ if(cert2->isRoot) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
+ break;
+ }
+ cert3 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert2, now, certUsageSSLCA);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
+ cert2 = cert3;
+ }
+ }
+
+ result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(conn->data, i);
+ if(!result) {
+ for(i = 0; cert; cert = cert2) {
+ result = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, i++, (char *)cert->derCert.data,
+ (char *)cert->derCert.data +
+ cert->derCert.len);
+ if(result)
+ break;
+
+ if(cert->isRoot) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock)
+{
+ struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+
+ /* remember the cert verification result */
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
+
+ if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+ /* we are asked not to verify the host name */
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /* print only info about the cert, the error is printed off the callback */
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+ if(cert) {
+ infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
+ display_cert_info(data, cert);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ }
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Check that the Peer certificate's issuer certificate matches the one found
+ * by issuer_nickname. This is not exactly the way OpenSSL and GNU TLS do the
+ * issuer check, so we provide comments that mimic the OpenSSL
+ * X509_check_issued function (in x509v3/v3_purp.c)
+ */
+static SECStatus check_issuer_cert(PRFileDesc *sock,
+ char *issuer_nickname)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *cert, *cert_issuer, *issuer;
+ SECStatus res=SECSuccess;
+ void *proto_win = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ PRArenaPool *tmpArena = NULL;
+ CERTAuthKeyID *authorityKeyID = NULL;
+ SECITEM *caname = NULL;
+ */
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+ cert_issuer = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, PR_Now(), certUsageObjectSigner);
+
+ proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
+ issuer = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(issuer_nickname, proto_win);
+
+ if((!cert_issuer) || (!issuer))
+ res = SECFailure;
+ else if(SECITEM_CompareItem(&cert_issuer->derCert,
+ &issuer->derCert)!=SECEqual)
+ res = SECFailure;
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuer);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_issuer);
+ return res;
+}
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Callback to pick the SSL client certificate.
+ */
+static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock,
+ struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames,
+ struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert,
+ struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = connssl->data;
+ const char *nickname = connssl->client_nickname;
+
+ if(connssl->obj_clicert) {
+ /* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */
+ static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
+ SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+ void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
+ struct CERTCertificateStr *cert;
+ struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key;
+
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(pem_slotname);
+ if(NULL == slot) {
+ failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if(PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, connssl->obj_clicert, CKA_VALUE,
+ &cert_der) != SECSuccess) {
+ failf(data, "NSS: CKA_VALUE not found in PK11 generic object");
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ cert = PK11_FindCertFromDERCertItem(slot, &cert_der, proto_win);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_der, PR_FALSE);
+ if(NULL == cert) {
+ failf(data, "NSS: client certificate from file not found");
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, cert, NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if(NULL == key) {
+ failf(data, "NSS: private key from file not found");
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "NSS: client certificate from file\n");
+ display_cert_info(data, cert);
+
+ *pRetCert = cert;
+ *pRetKey = key;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* use the default NSS hook */
+ if(SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames,
+ pRetCert, pRetKey)
+ || NULL == *pRetCert) {
+
+ if(NULL == nickname)
+ failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not "
+ "specified)");
+ else
+ failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname);
+
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* get certificate nickname if any */
+ nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname;
+ if(NULL == nickname)
+ nickname = "[unknown]";
+
+ if(NULL == *pRetKey) {
+ failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname);
+ display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* update blocking direction in case of PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR */
+static void nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_state state, void *secret)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)secret;
+ if(PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ /* an unrelated error is passing by */
+ return;
+
+ switch(connssl->connecting_state) {
+ case ssl_connect_2:
+ case ssl_connect_2_reading:
+ case ssl_connect_2_writing:
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* we are not called from an SSL handshake */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* update the state accordingly */
+ connssl->connecting_state = state;
+}
+
+/* recv() wrapper we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
+static PRInt32 nspr_io_recv(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ const PRRecvFN recv_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ const PRInt32 rv = recv_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+ if(rv < 0)
+ /* check for PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR and update blocking direction */
+ nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_2_reading, fd->secret);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* send() wrapper we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
+static PRInt32 nspr_io_send(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ const PRSendFN send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ const PRInt32 rv = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+ if(rv < 0)
+ /* check for PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR and update blocking direction */
+ nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_2_writing, fd->secret);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* close() wrapper to avoid assertion failure due to fd->secret != NULL */
+static PRStatus nspr_io_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ const PRCloseFN close_fn = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close;
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return close_fn(fd);
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+static CURLcode nss_init_core(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *cert_dir)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters initparams;
+
+ if(nss_context != NULL)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ memset((void *) &initparams, '\0', sizeof(initparams));
+ initparams.length = sizeof(initparams);
+
+ if(cert_dir) {
+ char *certpath = aprintf("sql:%s", cert_dir);
+ if(!certpath)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: %s\n", certpath);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(certpath, "", "", "", &initparams,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ free(certpath);
+
+ if(nss_context != NULL)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS database\n");
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: none\n");
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", &initparams, NSS_INIT_READONLY
+ | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB | NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN
+ | NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if(nss_context != NULL)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS\n");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+static CURLcode nss_init(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+ char *cert_dir;
+ struct_stat st;
+ CURLcode result;
+
+ if(initialized)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ /* list of all CRL items we need to destroy in Curl_nss_cleanup() */
+ nss_crl_list = Curl_llist_alloc(nss_destroy_crl_item);
+ if(!nss_crl_list)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ /* First we check if $SSL_DIR points to a valid dir */
+ cert_dir = getenv("SSL_DIR");
+ if(cert_dir) {
+ if((stat(cert_dir, &st) != 0) ||
+ (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) {
+ cert_dir = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now we check if the default location is a valid dir */
+ if(!cert_dir) {
+ if((stat(SSL_DIR, &st) == 0) &&
+ (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) {
+ cert_dir = (char *)SSL_DIR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(nspr_io_identity == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER) {
+ /* allocate an identity for our own NSPR I/O layer */
+ nspr_io_identity = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("libcurl");
+ if(nspr_io_identity == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ /* the default methods just call down to the lower I/O layer */
+ memcpy(&nspr_io_methods, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods(), sizeof nspr_io_methods);
+
+ /* override certain methods in the table by our wrappers */
+ nspr_io_methods.recv = nspr_io_recv;
+ nspr_io_methods.send = nspr_io_send;
+ nspr_io_methods.close = nspr_io_close;
+ }
+
+ result = nss_init_core(data, cert_dir);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+
+ if(num_enabled_ciphers() == 0)
+ NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+
+ initialized = 1;
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Global SSL init
+ *
+ * @retval 0 error initializing SSL
+ * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
+ */
+CURL_STATIC int Curl_nss_init(void)
+{
+ /* curl_global_init() is not thread-safe so this test is ok */
+ if(nss_initlock == NULL) {
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 256);
+ nss_initlock = PR_NewLock();
+ nss_crllock = PR_NewLock();
+ }
+
+ /* We will actually initialize NSS later */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+CURL_STATIC CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+ CURLcode result;
+ if(!nss_initlock) {
+ if(data)
+ failf(data, "unable to initialize NSS, curl_global_init() should have "
+ "been called with CURL_GLOBAL_SSL or CURL_GLOBAL_ALL");
+ return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+ }
+
+ PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+ result = nss_init(data);
+ PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* Global cleanup */
+CURL_STATIC void Curl_nss_cleanup(void)
+{
+ /* This function isn't required to be threadsafe and this is only done
+ * as a safety feature.
+ */
+ PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+ if(initialized) {
+ /* Free references to client certificates held in the SSL session cache.
+ * Omitting this hampers destruction of the security module owning
+ * the certificates. */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+
+ if(mod && SECSuccess == SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(mod)) {
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ mod = NULL;
+ }
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* destroy all CRL items */
+ Curl_llist_destroy(nss_crl_list, NULL);
+ nss_crl_list = NULL;
+
+ PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+
+ PR_DestroyLock(nss_initlock);
+ PR_DestroyLock(nss_crllock);
+ nss_initlock = NULL;
+
+ initialized = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status.
+ *
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1 means the connection is still in place
+ * 0 means the connection has been closed
+ * -1 means the connection status is unknown
+ */
+CURL_STATIC int
+Curl_nss_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char buf;
+
+ rc =
+ PR_Recv(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void *)&buf, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK,
+ PR_SecondsToInterval(1));
+ if(rc > 0)
+ return 1; /* connection still in place */
+
+ if(rc == 0)
+ return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+
+ return -1; /* connection status unknown */
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
+ */
+CURL_STATIC void Curl_nss_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+
+ if(connssl->handle) {
+ /* NSS closes the socket we previously handed to it, so we must mark it
+ as closed to avoid double close */
+ fake_sclose(conn->sock[sockindex]);
+ conn->sock[sockindex] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+
+ if((connssl->client_nickname != NULL) || (connssl->obj_clicert != NULL))
+ /* A server might require different authentication based on the
+ * particular path being requested by the client. To support this
+ * scenario, we must ensure that a connection will never reuse the
+ * authentication data from a previous connection. */
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(connssl->handle);
+
+ free(connssl->client_nickname);
+ connssl->client_nickname = NULL;
+ /* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */
+ Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL);
+ connssl->obj_list = NULL;
+ connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
+
+ PR_Close(connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* return true if NSS can provide error code (and possibly msg) for the
+ error */
+static bool is_nss_error(CURLcode err)
+{
+ switch(err) {
+ case CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION:
+ case CURLE_SSL_CACERT:
+ case CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM:
+ case CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR:
+ case CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR:
+ return true;
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+/* return true if the given error code is related to a client certificate */
+static bool is_cc_error(PRInt32 err)
+{
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT:
+ case SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT:
+ case SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT:
+ return true;
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+static Curl_recv nss_recv;
+static Curl_send nss_send;
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex)
+{
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ const char *cafile = data->set.ssl.CAfile;
+ const char *capath = data->set.ssl.CApath;
+
+ if(cafile) {
+ CURLcode result = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cafile, PR_TRUE);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ if(capath) {
+ struct_stat st;
+ if(stat(capath, &st) == -1)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+
+ if(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+ PRDirEntry *entry;
+ PRDir *dir = PR_OpenDir(capath);
+ if(!dir)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+
+ while((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH | PR_SKIP_HIDDEN))) {
+ char *fullpath = aprintf("%s/%s", capath, entry->name);
+ if(!fullpath) {
+ PR_CloseDir(dir);
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if(CURLE_OK != nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], fullpath, PR_TRUE))
+ /* This is purposefully tolerant of errors so non-PEM files can
+ * be in the same directory */
+ infof(data, "failed to load '%s' from CURLOPT_CAPATH\n", fullpath);
+
+ free(fullpath);
+ }
+
+ PR_CloseDir(dir);
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "warning: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)\n", capath);
+ }
+
+ infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s\n",
+ cafile ? cafile : "none",
+ capath ? capath : "none");
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_init_sslver(SSLVersionRange *sslver,
+ struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+ switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
+ default:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+ sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#elif defined SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+#endif
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+ sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2;
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+ sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0;
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
+ sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+
+ failf(data, "TLS minor version cannot be set");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_fail_connect(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+ struct SessionHandle *data,
+ CURLcode curlerr)
+{
+ PRErrorCode err = 0;
+
+ if(is_nss_error(curlerr)) {
+ /* read NSPR error code */
+ err = PR_GetError();
+ if(is_cc_error(err))
+ curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+ /* print the error number and error string */
+ infof(data, "NSS error %d (%s)\n", err, nss_error_to_name(err));
+
+ /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+ nss_print_error_message(data, err);
+ }
+
+ /* cleanup on connection failure */
+ Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL);
+ connssl->obj_list = NULL;
+
+ return curlerr;
+}
+
+/* Switch the SSL socket into non-blocking mode. */
+static CURLcode nss_set_nonblock(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+ struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+ static PRSocketOptionData sock_opt;
+ sock_opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
+ sock_opt.value.non_blocking = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if(PR_SetSocketOption(connssl->handle, &sock_opt) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR);
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ PRFileDesc *model = NULL;
+ PRFileDesc *nspr_io = NULL;
+ PRFileDesc *nspr_io_stub = NULL;
+ PRBool ssl_no_cache;
+ PRBool ssl_cbc_random_iv;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ CURLcode result;
+
+ SSLVersionRange sslver = {
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, /* min */
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 /* max */
+ };
+
+ connssl->data = data;
+
+ /* list of all NSS objects we need to destroy in Curl_nss_close() */
+ connssl->obj_list = Curl_llist_alloc(nss_destroy_object);
+ if(!connssl->obj_list)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ /* FIXME. NSS doesn't support multiple databases open at the same time. */
+ PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+ result = nss_init(conn->data);
+ if(result) {
+ PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+
+ if(!mod) {
+ char *configstring = aprintf("library=%s name=PEM", pem_library);
+ if(!configstring) {
+ PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(configstring, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ free(configstring);
+
+ if(!mod || !mod->loaded) {
+ if(mod) {
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ mod = NULL;
+ }
+ infof(data, "WARNING: failed to load NSS PEM library %s. Using "
+ "OpenSSL PEM certificates will not work.\n", pem_library);
+ }
+ }
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(nss_get_password);
+ PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+
+ model = PR_NewTCPSocket();
+ if(!model)
+ goto error;
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* do not use SSL cache if disabled or we are not going to verify peer */
+ ssl_no_cache = (conn->ssl_config.sessionid && data->set.ssl.verifypeer) ?
+ PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_NO_CACHE, ssl_no_cache) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* enable/disable the requested SSL version(s) */
+ if(nss_init_sslver(&sslver, data) != CURLE_OK)
+ goto error;
+ if(SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ ssl_cbc_random_iv = !data->set.ssl_enable_beast;
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we
+ use the work-around */
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, ssl_cbc_random_iv) != SECSuccess)
+ infof(data, "warning: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d\n",
+ ssl_cbc_random_iv);
+#else
+ if(ssl_cbc_random_iv)
+ infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in\n");
+#endif
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.cipher_list) {
+ if(set_ciphers(data, model, data->set.ssl.cipher_list) != SECSuccess) {
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer && data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+ infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost\n");
+
+ /* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
+ * verify peer */
+ if(SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, nss_auth_cert_hook, conn) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=0; /* not checked yet */
+ if(SSL_BadCertHook(model, BadCertHandler, conn) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ if(SSL_HandshakeCallback(model, HandshakeCallback, conn) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(conn, sockindex);
+ if(rv) {
+ result = rv;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.CRLfile) {
+ const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(data->set.ssl.CRLfile);
+ if(rv) {
+ result = rv;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", data->set.ssl.CRLfile);
+ }
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
+ char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_CERT);
+ if(nickname) {
+ /* we are not going to use libnsspem.so to read the client cert */
+ connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
+ }
+ else {
+ CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, data->set.str[STRING_CERT],
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY]);
+ if(rv) {
+ /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
+ result = rv;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* store the nickname for SelectClientCert() called during handshake */
+ connssl->client_nickname = nickname;
+ }
+ else
+ connssl->client_nickname = NULL;
+
+ if(SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(model, SelectClientCert,
+ (void *)connssl) != SECSuccess) {
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* wrap OS file descriptor by NSPR's file descriptor abstraction */
+ nspr_io = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd);
+ if(!nspr_io)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* create our own NSPR I/O layer */
+ nspr_io_stub = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(nspr_io_identity, &nspr_io_methods);
+ if(!nspr_io_stub) {
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* make the per-connection data accessible from NSPR I/O callbacks */
+ nspr_io_stub->secret = (void *)connssl;
+
+ /* push our new layer to the NSPR I/O stack */
+ if(PR_PushIOLayer(nspr_io, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, nspr_io_stub) != PR_SUCCESS) {
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ PR_Close(nspr_io_stub);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* import our model socket onto the current I/O stack */
+ connssl->handle = SSL_ImportFD(model, nspr_io);
+ if(!connssl->handle) {
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model); /* We don't need this any more */
+ model = NULL;
+
+ /* This is the password associated with the cert that we're using */
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(connssl->handle, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING, PR_TRUE)
+ != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_NPN
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_NPN, data->set.ssl_enable_npn
+ ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_ALPN
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_ALPN, data->set.ssl_enable_alpn
+ ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START
+ if(data->set.ssl.falsestart) {
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START, PR_TRUE)
+ != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ if(SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(connssl->handle, CanFalseStartCallback,
+ conn) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SSL_ENABLE_NPN) || defined(SSL_ENABLE_ALPN)
+ if(data->set.ssl_enable_npn || data->set.ssl_enable_alpn) {
+ int cur = 0;
+ unsigned char protocols[128];
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(data->set.httpversion == CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2_0) {
+ protocols[cur++] = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
+ memcpy(&protocols[cur], NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
+ NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN);
+ cur += NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
+ }
+#endif
+ protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH);
+ cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+
+ if(SSL_SetNextProtoNego(connssl->handle, protocols, cur) != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+ }
+#endif
+
+
+ /* Force handshake on next I/O */
+ SSL_ResetHandshake(connssl->handle, /* asServer */ PR_FALSE);
+
+ SSL_SetURL(connssl->handle, conn->host.name);
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+error:
+ if(model)
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, result);
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ PRUint32 timeout;
+
+ /* check timeout situation */
+ const long time_left = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+ if(time_left < 0L) {
+ failf(data, "timed out before SSL handshake");
+ result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* Force the handshake now */
+ timeout = PR_MillisecondsToInterval((PRUint32) time_left);
+ if(SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(connssl->handle, timeout) != SECSuccess) {
+ if(PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ /* blocking direction is updated by nss_update_connecting_state() */
+ return CURLE_AGAIN;
+ else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN)
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult!=0)
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ result = display_conn_info(conn, connssl->handle);
+ if(result)
+ goto error;
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
+ SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
+ char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT);
+ if(nickname) {
+ /* we support only nicknames in case of STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT for now */
+ ret = check_issuer_cert(connssl->handle, nickname);
+ free(nickname);
+ }
+
+ if(SECFailure == ret) {
+ infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check failed\n");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check ok\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+error:
+ return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, result);
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+ bool *done)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ const bool blocking = (done == NULL);
+ CURLcode result;
+
+ if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_1) {
+ result = nss_setup_connect(conn, sockindex);
+ if(result)
+ /* we do not expect CURLE_AGAIN from nss_setup_connect() */
+ return result;
+
+ if(!blocking) {
+ /* in non-blocking mode, set NSS non-blocking mode before handshake */
+ result = nss_set_nonblock(connssl, data);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+ }
+
+ result = nss_do_connect(conn, sockindex);
+ switch(result) {
+ case CURLE_OK:
+ break;
+ case CURLE_AGAIN:
+ if(!blocking)
+ /* CURLE_AGAIN in non-blocking mode is not an error */
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ /* fall through */
+ default:
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ if(blocking) {
+ /* in blocking mode, set NSS non-blocking mode _after_ SSL handshake */
+ result = nss_set_nonblock(connssl, data);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+ }
+ else
+ /* signal completed SSL handshake */
+ *done = TRUE;
+
+ connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
+ conn->recv[sockindex] = nss_recv;
+ conn->send[sockindex] = nss_send;
+
+ /* ssl_connect_done is never used outside, go back to the initial state */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+CURL_STATIC CURLcode Curl_nss_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ return nss_connect_common(conn, sockindex, /* blocking */ NULL);
+}
+
+CURL_STATIC CURLcode Curl_nss_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex, bool *done)
+{
+ return nss_connect_common(conn, sockindex, done);
+}
+
+static ssize_t nss_send(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */
+ int sockindex, /* socketindex */
+ const void *mem, /* send this data */
+ size_t len, /* amount to write */
+ CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+ ssize_t rc = PR_Send(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, (int)len, 0,
+ PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ if(rc < 0) {
+ PRInt32 err = PR_GetError();
+ if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ else {
+ /* print the error number and error string */
+ const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+ infof(conn->data, "SSL write: error %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
+
+ /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+ nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err);
+
+ *curlcode = (is_cc_error(err))
+ ? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM
+ : CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return rc; /* number of bytes */
+}
+
+static ssize_t nss_recv(struct connectdata * conn, /* connection data */
+ int num, /* socketindex */
+ char *buf, /* store read data here */
+ size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
+ CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+ ssize_t nread = PR_Recv(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, (int)buffersize, 0,
+ PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ if(nread < 0) {
+ /* failed SSL read */
+ PRInt32 err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ else {
+ /* print the error number and error string */
+ const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+ infof(conn->data, "SSL read: errno %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
+
+ /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+ nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err);
+
+ *curlcode = (is_cc_error(err))
+ ? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM
+ : CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return nread;
+}
+
+CURL_STATIC size_t Curl_nss_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, "NSS/%s", NSS_VERSION);
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+CURL_STATIC int Curl_nss_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+ /* make sure that NSS is initialized */
+ return !!Curl_nss_force_init(data);
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+CURL_STATIC int Curl_nss_random(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ unsigned char *entropy,
+ size_t length)
+{
+ Curl_nss_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+
+ if(SECSuccess != PK11_GenerateRandom(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length)))
+ /* signal a failure */
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+CURL_STATIC void Curl_nss_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+ size_t tmplen,
+ unsigned char *md5sum, /* output */
+ size_t md5len)
+{
+ PK11Context *MD5pw = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
+ unsigned int MD5out;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(MD5pw, tmp, curlx_uztoui(tmplen));
+ PK11_DigestFinal(MD5pw, md5sum, &MD5out, curlx_uztoui(md5len));
+ PK11_DestroyContext(MD5pw, PR_TRUE);
+}
+
+CURL_STATIC bool Curl_nss_cert_status_request(void)
+{
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
+ return TRUE;
+#else
+ return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+CURL_STATIC bool Curl_nss_false_start(void) {
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START
+ return TRUE;
+#else
+ return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */