From 81db488ebe397ddba4e51e04c0719023ef18cf70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michał Cichoń Date: Sun, 6 May 2012 01:46:56 +0200 Subject: Replace axTLS with PolarSSL as it does not handle secure connections well enough. --- axTLS/src/ssl/x509.c | 564 --------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 564 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 axTLS/src/ssl/x509.c (limited to 'axTLS/src/ssl/x509.c') diff --git a/axTLS/src/ssl/x509.c b/axTLS/src/ssl/x509.c deleted file mode 100644 index 116fa00..0000000 --- a/axTLS/src/ssl/x509.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,564 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2007, Cameron Rich - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the name of the axTLS project nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR - * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR - * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, - * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -/** - * @file x509.c - * - * Certificate processing. - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include "os_port.h" -#include "crypto_misc.h" - -#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION -/** - * Retrieve the signature from a certificate. - */ -static const uint8_t *get_signature(const uint8_t *asn1_sig, int *len) -{ - int offset = 0; - const uint8_t *ptr = NULL; - - if (asn1_next_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 || - asn1_skip_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE)) - goto end_get_sig; - - if (asn1_sig[offset++] != ASN1_OCTET_STRING) - goto end_get_sig; - *len = get_asn1_length(asn1_sig, &offset); - ptr = &asn1_sig[offset]; /* all ok */ - -end_get_sig: - return ptr; -} - -#endif - -/** - * Construct a new x509 object. - * @return 0 if ok. < 0 if there was a problem. - */ -int x509_new(const uint8_t *cert, int *len, X509_CTX **ctx) -{ - int begin_tbs, end_tbs; - int ret = X509_NOT_OK, offset = 0, cert_size = 0; - X509_CTX *x509_ctx; - BI_CTX *bi_ctx; - SHA1_CTX sha_ctx_fp; - - *ctx = (X509_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof(X509_CTX)); - x509_ctx = *ctx; - - /* get the certificate size */ - asn1_skip_obj(cert, &cert_size, ASN1_SEQUENCE); - - if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0) - goto end_cert; - - begin_tbs = offset; /* start of the tbs */ - end_tbs = begin_tbs; /* work out the end of the tbs */ - asn1_skip_obj(cert, &end_tbs, ASN1_SEQUENCE); - - if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0) - goto end_cert; - - if (cert[offset] == ASN1_EXPLICIT_TAG) /* optional version */ - { - if (asn1_version(cert, &offset, x509_ctx)) - goto end_cert; - } - - if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_INTEGER) || /* serial number */ - asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0) - goto end_cert; - - /* make sure the signature is ok */ - if (asn1_signature_type(cert, &offset, x509_ctx)) - { - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST; - goto end_cert; - } - - if (asn1_name(cert, &offset, x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn) || - asn1_validity(cert, &offset, x509_ctx) || - asn1_name(cert, &offset, x509_ctx->cert_dn) || - asn1_public_key(cert, &offset, x509_ctx)) - { - goto end_cert; - } - - bi_ctx = x509_ctx->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx; - - SHA1_Init(&sha_ctx_fp); - SHA1_Update(&sha_ctx_fp, cert, cert_size); - SHA1_Final(x509_ctx->sha1_fingerprint, &sha_ctx_fp); - -#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION /* only care if doing verification */ - /* use the appropriate signature algorithm (SHA1/MD5/MD2) */ - if (x509_ctx->sig_type == SIG_TYPE_MD5) - { - MD5_CTX md5_ctx; - uint8_t md5_dgst[MD5_SIZE]; - MD5_Init(&md5_ctx); - MD5_Update(&md5_ctx, &cert[begin_tbs], end_tbs-begin_tbs); - MD5_Final(md5_dgst, &md5_ctx); - x509_ctx->digest = bi_import(bi_ctx, md5_dgst, MD5_SIZE); - } - else if (x509_ctx->sig_type == SIG_TYPE_SHA1) - { - SHA1_CTX sha_ctx; - uint8_t sha_dgst[SHA1_SIZE]; - SHA1_Init(&sha_ctx); - SHA1_Update(&sha_ctx, &cert[begin_tbs], end_tbs-begin_tbs); - SHA1_Final(sha_dgst, &sha_ctx); - x509_ctx->digest = bi_import(bi_ctx, sha_dgst, SHA1_SIZE); - } - else if (x509_ctx->sig_type == SIG_TYPE_MD2) - { - MD2_CTX md2_ctx; - uint8_t md2_dgst[MD2_SIZE]; - MD2_Init(&md2_ctx); - MD2_Update(&md2_ctx, &cert[begin_tbs], end_tbs-begin_tbs); - MD2_Final(md2_dgst, &md2_ctx); - x509_ctx->digest = bi_import(bi_ctx, md2_dgst, MD2_SIZE); - } - - if (cert[offset] == ASN1_V3_DATA) - { - int suboffset; - - ++offset; - get_asn1_length(cert, &offset); - - if ((suboffset = asn1_find_subjectaltname(cert, offset)) > 0) - { - if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &suboffset, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) > 0) - { - int altlen; - - if ((altlen = asn1_next_obj(cert, - &suboffset, ASN1_SEQUENCE)) > 0) - { - int endalt = suboffset + altlen; - int totalnames = 0; - - while (suboffset < endalt) - { - int type = cert[suboffset++]; - int dnslen = get_asn1_length(cert, &suboffset); - - if (type == ASN1_CONTEXT_DNSNAME) - { - x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames = (char**) - realloc(x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames, - (totalnames + 2) * sizeof(char*)); - x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames] = - (char*)malloc(dnslen + 1); - x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames+1] = NULL; - memcpy(x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames], - cert + suboffset, dnslen); - x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[ - totalnames][dnslen] = 0; - ++totalnames; - } - - suboffset += dnslen; - } - } - } - } - } - - offset = end_tbs; /* skip the rest of v3 data */ - if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) || - asn1_signature(cert, &offset, x509_ctx)) - goto end_cert; -#endif - ret = X509_OK; -end_cert: - if (len) - { - *len = cert_size; - } - - if (ret) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE - printf("Error: Invalid X509 ASN.1 file (%s)\n", - x509_display_error(ret)); -#endif - x509_free(x509_ctx); - *ctx = NULL; - } - - return ret; -} - -/** - * Free an X.509 object's resources. - */ -void x509_free(X509_CTX *x509_ctx) -{ - X509_CTX *next; - int i; - - if (x509_ctx == NULL) /* if already null, then don't bother */ - return; - - for (i = 0; i < X509_NUM_DN_TYPES; i++) - { - free(x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn[i]); - free(x509_ctx->cert_dn[i]); - } - - free(x509_ctx->signature); - -#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION - if (x509_ctx->digest) - { - bi_free(x509_ctx->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx, x509_ctx->digest); - } - - if (x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames) - { - for (i = 0; x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[i]; ++i) - free(x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[i]); - - free(x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames); - } -#endif - - RSA_free(x509_ctx->rsa_ctx); - next = x509_ctx->next; - free(x509_ctx); - x509_free(next); /* clear the chain */ -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION -/** - * Take a signature and decrypt it. - */ -static bigint *sig_verify(BI_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, int sig_len, - bigint *modulus, bigint *pub_exp) -{ - int i, size; - bigint *decrypted_bi, *dat_bi; - bigint *bir = NULL; - uint8_t *block = (uint8_t *)alloca(sig_len); - - /* decrypt */ - dat_bi = bi_import(ctx, sig, sig_len); - ctx->mod_offset = BIGINT_M_OFFSET; - - /* convert to a normal block */ - decrypted_bi = bi_mod_power2(ctx, dat_bi, modulus, pub_exp); - - bi_export(ctx, decrypted_bi, block, sig_len); - ctx->mod_offset = BIGINT_M_OFFSET; - - i = 10; /* start at the first possible non-padded byte */ - while (block[i++] && i < sig_len); - size = sig_len - i; - - /* get only the bit we want */ - if (size > 0) - { - int len; - const uint8_t *sig_ptr = get_signature(&block[i], &len); - - if (sig_ptr) - { - bir = bi_import(ctx, sig_ptr, len); - } - } - - /* save a few bytes of memory */ - bi_clear_cache(ctx); - return bir; -} - -/** - * Do some basic checks on the certificate chain. - * - * Certificate verification consists of a number of checks: - * - The date of the certificate is after the start date. - * - The date of the certificate is before the finish date. - * - A root certificate exists in the certificate store. - * - That the certificate(s) are not self-signed. - * - The certificate chain is valid. - * - The signature of the certificate is valid. - */ -int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert) -{ - int ret = X509_OK, i = 0; - bigint *cert_sig; - X509_CTX *next_cert = NULL; - BI_CTX *ctx = NULL; - bigint *mod = NULL, *expn = NULL; - int match_ca_cert = 0; - struct timeval tv; - uint8_t is_self_signed = 0; - - if (cert == NULL) - { - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT; - goto end_verify; - } - - /* a self-signed certificate that is not in the CA store - use this - to check the signature */ - if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, cert->cert_dn) == 0) - { - is_self_signed = 1; - ctx = cert->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx; - mod = cert->rsa_ctx->m; - expn = cert->rsa_ctx->e; - } - - gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); - - /* check the not before date */ - if (tv.tv_sec < cert->not_before) - { - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID; - goto end_verify; - } - - /* check the not after date */ - if (tv.tv_sec > cert->not_after) - { - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_EXPIRED; - goto end_verify; - } - - next_cert = cert->next; - - /* last cert in the chain - look for a trusted cert */ - if (next_cert == NULL) - { - if (ca_cert_ctx != NULL) - { - /* go thu the CA store */ - while (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]) - { - if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, - ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->cert_dn) == 0) - { - /* use this CA certificate for signature verification */ - match_ca_cert = 1; - ctx = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx; - mod = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->m; - expn = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->e; - break; - } - - i++; - } - } - - /* couldn't find a trusted cert (& let self-signed errors - be returned) */ - if (!match_ca_cert && !is_self_signed) - { - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT; - goto end_verify; - } - } - else if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, next_cert->cert_dn) != 0) - { - /* check the chain */ - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_INVALID_CHAIN; - goto end_verify; - } - else /* use the next certificate in the chain for signature verify */ - { - ctx = next_cert->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx; - mod = next_cert->rsa_ctx->m; - expn = next_cert->rsa_ctx->e; - } - - /* cert is self signed */ - if (!match_ca_cert && is_self_signed) - { - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED; - goto end_verify; - } - - /* check the signature */ - cert_sig = sig_verify(ctx, cert->signature, cert->sig_len, - bi_clone(ctx, mod), bi_clone(ctx, expn)); - - if (cert_sig && cert->digest) - { - if (bi_compare(cert_sig, cert->digest) != 0) - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE; - - - bi_free(ctx, cert_sig); - } - else - { - ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE; - } - - if (ret) - goto end_verify; - - /* go down the certificate chain using recursion. */ - if (next_cert != NULL) - { - ret = x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, next_cert); - } - -end_verify: - return ret; -} -#endif - -#if defined (CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE) -/** - * Used for diagnostics. - */ -static const char *not_part_of_cert = ""; -void x509_print(const X509_CTX *cert, CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx) -{ - if (cert == NULL) - return; - - printf("=== CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO ===\n"); - printf("Common Name (CN):\t\t"); - printf("%s\n", cert->cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME] ? - cert->cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME] : not_part_of_cert); - - printf("Organization (O):\t\t"); - printf("%s\n", cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION] ? - cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION] : not_part_of_cert); - - printf("Organizational Unit (OU):\t"); - printf("%s\n", cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT] ? - cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT] : not_part_of_cert); - - printf("=== CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY ===\n"); - printf("Common Name (CN):\t\t"); - printf("%s\n", cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME] ? - cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME] : not_part_of_cert); - - printf("Organization (O):\t\t"); - printf("%s\n", cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION] ? - cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION] : not_part_of_cert); - - printf("Organizational Unit (OU):\t"); - printf("%s\n", cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT] ? - cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT] : not_part_of_cert); - - printf("Not Before:\t\t\t%s", ctime(&cert->not_before)); - printf("Not After:\t\t\t%s", ctime(&cert->not_after)); - printf("RSA bitsize:\t\t\t%d\n", cert->rsa_ctx->num_octets*8); - printf("Sig Type:\t\t\t"); - switch (cert->sig_type) - { - case SIG_TYPE_MD5: - printf("MD5\n"); - break; - case SIG_TYPE_SHA1: - printf("SHA1\n"); - break; - case SIG_TYPE_MD2: - printf("MD2\n"); - break; - default: - printf("Unrecognized: %d\n", cert->sig_type); - break; - } - - if (ca_cert_ctx) - { - printf("Verify:\t\t\t\t%s\n", - x509_display_error(x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, cert))); - } - -#if 0 - print_blob("Signature", cert->signature, cert->sig_len); - bi_print("Modulus", cert->rsa_ctx->m); - bi_print("Pub Exp", cert->rsa_ctx->e); -#endif - - if (ca_cert_ctx) - { - x509_print(cert->next, ca_cert_ctx); - } - - TTY_FLUSH(); -} - -const char * x509_display_error(int error) -{ - switch (error) - { - case X509_OK: - return "Certificate verify successful"; - - case X509_NOT_OK: - return "X509 not ok"; - - case X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT: - return "No trusted cert is available"; - - case X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: - return "Bad signature"; - - case X509_VFY_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID: - return "Cert is not yet valid"; - - case X509_VFY_ERROR_EXPIRED: - return "Cert has expired"; - - case X509_VFY_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED: - return "Cert is self-signed"; - - case X509_VFY_ERROR_INVALID_CHAIN: - return "Chain is invalid (check order of certs)"; - - case X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST: - return "Unsupported digest"; - - case X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY: - return "Invalid private key"; - - default: - return "Unknown"; - } -} -#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE */ - -- cgit v1.2.3